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Comments
The Asbestos Claims Facility-An Alternative to
Litigation*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 19, 1985, after more than three years of negotiations,
the Agreement Concerning Asbestos-Related Claims (Agreement)
was signed by thirty-four asbestos manufacturers (producers) and
sixteen insurance groups (insurers).1 The Agreement, which will
eventually lead to an independent Asbestos Claims Facility (Facil-
ity), is the result of a private sector effort to develop a means of
handling the thousands of asbestos-related bodily injury claims
that have inundated the courts of this country over the last two
decades.2 To date, more than 35,000 asbestos-related bodily injury
lawsuits have been filed and many more await filing.'
The weight that can be afforded to the signatures of representa-
tives of fifty corporations on one document is impressive in and of
itself. However, the important question is: why make a monumen-
* The author wishes to thank James J. Restivo, Jr. of the Pittsburgh law firm of Reed
Smith Shaw & McClay whose help was invaluable in doing the research for this comment.
1. Fifty Companies Sign up for Wellington, Making Plan Feasible, 1 MEALEY'S LITI-
GATION REP.-INSURANCE, 763, 763-64 (June 24, 1985). The original signatories to the Agree-
ment were A C & S, Inc., Aetna Life & Casualty, Co., American Universal Insurance Group,
Armstrong World Industries, Bituminous Casualty Corp., Carey Canada, Inc., The Celotex
Corp., CertainTeed Corp., C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc., CIGNA Property and Casualty Cos.,
Continental Corp., Crum & Forster, Dana Corp., Eagle-Pitcher Industries, Inc., Employers
Insurance of Wausau, Fibreboard Corp., Fireman's Fund, Inc., First State Insurance Co.,
Flexitallic Gasket Co., Inc., The Flintkote Co., Genstar Corp., Harbor Insurance Co., Hart-
ford Insurance Group, H.K. Porter, Inc., Hopeman Brothers, Inc., The Keene Corp., Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co., Lloyd's of London, Maremont Corp., National Gypsum Co., Nosroc
Corp., Nuclear & Environmental Protection, Inc., Nuturn Corp., Owens-Corning Fiberglas,
Owens-Illinois, Inc., Pittsburgh-Corning Corp., Reliance Insurance Co., Rock Wool Manu-
facturing Co., Royal Insurance Co., Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., Thorpe Insulations,
Turner & Newall PLC, Unijax, United States Gypsum, Zurich-American Insurance Cos.,
and five confidential manufacturers. Id.
2. Id.
3. Kuntz, Everybody Out of the Pool, FoRBEs, Dec. 16, 1985 at 83.
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tal effort to arrive at a private solution to what has become one of
the major legal and social problems of this century? The simple
answer is that it became evident to those involved in asbestos liti-
gation that the legal system was failing to handle the claims in a
just, efficient and timely manner.4 Thus, it was felt that the only
possible solution would have to be a private one.
This comment will trace the reasons behind and the creation of
the Agreement. In addition, the proposed operation of the Facility,
the reactions to the concept and the activities to date of the newly-
formed group will also be outlined. As a basic premise, it is fair to
say that the Facility is the only viable alternative to the flounder-
ing court system and this premise is explained and justified where
appropriate. Given the opportunity, the Facility should have two
important results: asbestos victims will be able to get fair and
timely compensation and corporations will be able to get on with
the business of being corporations, not litigators.5
II. THE ASBESTOS CRISIS
The reasons why the Facility was created are, in some senses, as
numerous as the number of corporations that have signed the
Agreement. It is neither possible nor educational to explore all of
the individual reasons given for signing. However, it is possible and
instructive to categorize the reasons into three broad groups. These
are the extent and nature of the asbestos-related litigation, the
burdensome costs of trying and/or settling the asbestos-related
bodily injury claims and the failure or inapplicability of other al-
ternatives to deal with these claims. Each of these broad groups is
outlined below.
A. The Extent and Nature of the Litigation
As indicated above, more than 35,000 asbestos-related bodily in-
jury lawsuits have been filed.7 At least 500 more of these suits are
4. It is not intended here to present the history of asbestos-related litigation but to
outline an alternative to that litigation. For an exhaustive treatment of the litigation itself
see, Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbes-
tos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. Rv. 573 (1983).
5. The writer makes this statement with personal knowledge of Chief Executive Of-
ficers who have spent the great majority of their time and effort and large amounts of corpo-
rate funds dealing with the asbestos litigation.
6. As will become evident, there is some overlap among these groups and this will be
considered where appropriate.
7. Kuntz, supra note 3, at 83.
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filed each month and there is no indication that this number will
decrease in the near future.8 In fact, some estimates indicate that
between 74,000 and 265,000 asbestos-related deaths are expected
over the next 30 years9 and that more than 21 million workers have
been exposed to asbestos over the last 40 years.10 These statistics
look even worse when two other notions are considered. First, some
suggest that fewer than 4,000 of the filed cases have been com-
pletely settled, through either the courts or independent means."
Second, estimates show that only two percent of asbestos claims
have reached resolution without a lawsuit being filed as compared
to more traditional tort claims of which only two percent ever have
to go to court. 2
The foregoing statistics have been called into question by some
individuals who concluded that the estimates do not withstand sci-
entific scrutiny.13 These same individuals also admitted, however,
that the actual extent of asbestos-related disease or exposure is not
certain."' Thus, there is still the possibility that several thousand
asbestos bodily injury suits could still be filed, but they simply
could not be handled by the already overloaded judicial system.
This alone might have caused parties liable for asbestos injuries to
seek an alternative, but other considerations also come into play.
One of these other considerations was the nature of asbestos dis-
ease and the effects therefrom on any litigation concerning the
problem. Basically, there are three disease processes that can be
medically related to exposure to asbestos: asbestosis, lung cancer
and mesothelioma.1 5 Further, one aspect of these asbestos-related
diseases has caused considerable difficulty in the litigation of
claims apart from proof of causation; namely, the latency period
between exposure to asbestos and the onset of the resultant dis-
ease.16 Estimates of this latency period range from seven to forty
8. Id. See also Backgrounder on the Asbestos Claim Facility (1984) (unpublished
information).
9. Riley, Asbestos: New Approaches, NAT'L L.J., May 7, 1984, at 1, 25.
10. Asbestos Makers Offer Deal on Claims, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 19, 1984, at
1, col. A, 3, Col. A.
11. Sugawara, Asbestos Plan Questioned by Union Official, Washington Post, March
20, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
12. Riley, supra note 9, at 26. See also McCarty, Asbestos Claims Facility to be Es-
tablished, The Pittsburgh Press, April 5, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
13. Address by Representative Erlenborn, Annual Government Briefing of the Insur-
ance Information Institute (June 19, 1984).
14. Id.
15. See generally, Special Project, supra note 4 at 577-82.
16. Id. The intent here is not to downplay the fact that debate over the medical issues
1986
Duquesne Law Review
years with a generally accepted average of between twenty and
thirty years.
17
The problems caused by the latency period in victim versus pro-
ducer claims can be illustrated by means of the hypothetical case
which follows. Suppose there is a World War II shipyard worker
who experienced breathing difficulties in 1975 and who eventually
consulted a physician.18 As a result of the consultation and exami-
nation, he is told that he has an asbestos-related disease (asbesto-
sis). Furthermore, he is told that if he files a lawsuit, he can be
compensated for his injury. Thus, he hires an attorney and pro-
ceeds with the intention of litigating his claim. To do so, he must
provide certain information. For example, he will probably remem-
ber that between the years of 1942 and 1945 he worked at the Phil-
adelphia Naval Shipyard insulating pipes in the boiler rooms of
ships. He will also remember that the insulation materials he used
contained asbestos. However, he may not remember, after thirty
years, exactly which producers manufactured the insulation mater-
ials he used or even what the names of the products were. This
oversimplified scenario illustrates two significant problems that
have been prevalent in asbestos-related bodily injury litigation due
to latency periods. First, once the worker has been diagnosed as
having an asbestos-related disease, his cause of action has accrued
and he must file his suit within the period provided by the proper
statute of limitations. Second, he must decide which producers will
be named in his action. Moreover, both of these problems may be
aggravated by the progressive nature of asbestos-related diseases
whereby the worker's condition may worsen as time passes.19
With regard to the statute of limitations -problem, an injured
worker must file within a relatively short period or lose his claim.20
A person who is truly suffering from a demonstrable asbestos-re-
lated disease can go to court and probably receive an award
has cost a great deal of time and effort. However, this aspect of the underlying medical
issues in asbestos-related litigation is better addressed in topics other than the one
presented here. Id.
17. See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 4, at 579 nn.9-12. See also Backgrounder on
the Asbestos Claims Facility (1984), and Riley, supra note 9, at 25.
18. See generally Zinkewicz, Lloyd's Underwriters Recommend Central Facility for
Asbestos Cases, J. COM., Oct. 8, 1984, at 1A, col. 1. The author indicates that many present
claims date back to the 1940's because it takes some 30 years for asbestos-related diseases to
manifest themselves. The author then notes that the years 1940-45 saw many people work-
ing in shipyards where they were subject to asbestos fibres. Id.
19. See generally Special Project, supra note 4, at 577-82.
20. Tarnoff, Lawyers Ask Insurers for Asbestos Solutions, Bus. INS., Dec. 5, 1983, at
21. The period is generally two to four years. Id.
836 Vol. 24:833
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through either verdict or settlement if his case has been timely
filed. On the other hand, if the person is only marginally ill he
must choose between waiting to file, perhaps losing his cause of
action, and filing, perhaps receiving a very small verdict or settle-
ment or none at all. Faced with this choice, many plaintiffs have
filed with little or no impairment (adding even more cases to the
ever-growing court dockets).2 The inequitable result was that
some people received money for no injury whereas others received
nothing because their claims, though serious, were barred. Thus,
the conclusion was reached by some that a percentage of these
cases were either non-meritorious from a products liability stand-
point or were filed with the prospect of receiving some compensa-
tion regardless of the nature, extent or presence of any malady.2 3
Moreover, it was noted that by filing a suit, even those with a real
and immediate need were often required to wait for years for a
decision.24
The second problem, that of which parties to sue when it was not
known for certain which producer's product was used, also had an
entangling effect on asbestos-related litigation. To ensure that
their clients were able to litigate against a responsible party, plain-
tiffs' attorneys historically sued every producer that they could
find.2 5 The general consensus became that untangling the mess of
co-defendants could take years26 because the average number of
defendants in a case was twenty.2 7 This usually meant that there
would be at least twenty defense attorneys at every deposition,
trial, settlement conference, etc.28 Consequently, even plaintiffs' at-
torneys expressed the concern that, because of the multiplicity of
parties involved, settlements were difficult to construct when try-
ing to deal with twenty attorneys who, in turn, had to deal with




23. Address by Representative Erlenborn, Annual Government Briefing of the Insur-
ance Information Institute (June 19, 1984).
24. Backgrounder on the Asbestos Claims Facility (1984).
25. Greene, A Way Out of the Asbestos Mess, FORBES, Aug. 27, 1984 at 154.
26. Id.
27. Backgrounder on the Asbestos Claims Facility (1984)..
28. This multiplicity of attorneys also led to increased costs. See infra notes 59-62 and
accompanying text.




These problems led defense attorneys to an understanding that
the litigation of so many asbestos claims was highly inefficient and
inequitable.30 A good example of this was in the Philadelphia area
where, in 1984, five full-time "asbestos judges," had little if any
impact upon the asbestos cases waiting to be tried." Judge Rich-
ard B. Klein of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas
and Judge James J. McMonagle of the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas were interviewed in 1984.32 They felt that several
factors were impeding the asbestos litigation. These factors in-
cluded the excessive number of asbestos suits that had been filed,
the differing interests of the parties involved, the defendants' in-
ability to agree with one another or their insurers concerning lia-
bility, and the generally large number of parties involved. 3 They
also said that the problem in settling cases was not a matter of the
plaintiffs and the defendants being unable to agree on a settlement
figure, but rather a matter of the defendants not being able to
agree on their respective shares of liability.3 4 Finally, they indi-
cated that the litigation had been complicated by such issues as
unsettled areas of law and conflicting decisions between state and
federal courts.35 Thus, even the judges who were handling the cases
were in a quandary as to what to do with them.
The comments of Judges Klein and McMonagle point to two
other areas of asbestos-related litigation that have brought further
confusion and waste to the handling of the underlying claims: first,
that codefendants were wasting excessive time and money in trying
to place fault on each other, and second, that from the underlying
cases there arose a great deal of asbestos insurance coverage
litigation.
The efforts at liability-fixing as to codefendants were quite obvi-
ous. The producers and their insurers were dealing with liability
allegedly caused by exposures that took place years before the liti-
gation began. 6 In the adversarial situation that arose, there was a
30. The Wellington Plan for an Asbestos Claims Facility, 7 CLAIMS REP. 02-1591, 02-
1592 (Nov. 2, 1984).
31. Id. at 02-1592.
32. Tarnoff, Judges Hope that New Claims Facility Will Help Untangle Asbestos
Litigation, Bus. INS., July 9, 1984, at 3.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id. These problems related to the asbestos insurance coverage litigation. See infra
notes 39-50 and accompanying text and infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
36. System to Settle Asbestos Claims Proposed by Firms, Wall St. J., April 4, 1984, at
1, col. 1 (New York, Cleveland, Dallas, Chicago, Washington, San Francisco). See also supra
838 Vol. 24:833
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great deal of looking back and trying to remove liability by placing
it upon another company. 7 This occurred to the point that many
of those involved realized that an inordinate amount of energy and
money was being spent on assessing blame and responsibility by
joining codefendants or otherwise trying to look less responsible.38
The asbestos insurance coverage litigation which resulted from
the underlying cases in large measure was the result of the latency
period of asbestos-related diseases.39 Because of the varying insur-
ance coverage theories involved, a great deal of controversy existed
(and still exists) as to when a particular policy covered a latent
product liability claim. 40 There are basically three theories of in-
surance coverage triggers that were (and are) used in the asbestos-
related cases to determine when an insurance policy covers the
risk. The exposure theory states that the insurer is on the risk
when the claimant is exposed to the producer's product.4' The
manifestation theory indicates that the insurer's responsibility
does not begin until the claimant has contracted and demonstrated
an asbestos-related disease.42 The triple-trigger theory holds that
the insurer is responsible for the risk at exposure through the la-
tency period and at the time of manifestation. That is, the insurer
must give comprehensive coverage.43
The result of these varying theories was that the producers
wanted maximum coverage for their liability whereas no insurer
wanted to admit that its policy covered an asbestos claim.44 The
basic question became, "which one (policy) pays-the company
that insured the manufacturer when it sold the asbestos or the
notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
37. Id.
38. Backgrounder on the Asbestos Claims Facility (1984). The Backgrounder report
indicates that:
Intense debate over what to do about the problem of asbestos-related injuries has
centered in the courts, government, and editorial columns over the last decade. Dur-
ing that time an inordinate amount of energy has been spent assessing blame and
responsibility. Until recently, there was little hope for a solution that would solve the
problem quickly and fairly.
Id.
39. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
40. 36 VAND. L. REV. at 709-29.
41. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Indus., Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th
Cir. 1980) (2000 suits), clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 1009 (1981).
42. See Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1982).
43. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
44. Greene, supra note 25, at 154.
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company that insured the manufacturer when the claim came
in?'4 5 Since the time period was as long as forty years, there were
no clear-cut answers to this question, only more litigation."6 Com-
pounding this problem was the fact that from approximately the
mid-1970's, either insurance coverage for asbestos diseases was not
available or the policies were written very protectively with high
per claim deductibles.47 As a result, by 1984 there were between
thirty and forty insurance cases pending in the United States deal-
ing with how insurance coverage applied to asbestos cases or what
insurance a corporation had to respond to these cases.48 Moreover,
the United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to rule
on the insurance issues, deeming them to be issues of state con-
tract law and thus not matters for the Court's consideration.' As a
consequence, there seemed to be no end to the insurance litigation
which became another factor prompting producers and insurers to
seek an alternative means of handling the asbestos problem. 50
The asbestos-related bodily injury claims, then, produced two
types of inefficient and wasteful litigation-suits by victims against
asbestos producers and suits by asbestos producers against their
insurers.5 1 These suits eventually elicited some strong comments
about the litigation. For example, a Lloyd's underwriter, after
studying the litigation, opined that "[t]he American court system
appears to be more interested in social engineering rather than jus-
tice."52 Specifically, he felt that as a society we should get down to
the business of compensating deserving asbestos victims as op-
posed to carrying out an endless pattern of blame shifting.53 Others
observed that the attorneys who were given control of the asbestos
litigation were trained to try and to win cases which probably
meant that they would, over the long run, perpetuate the historical
pattern.5 Therefore, any expectation of making the litigation more
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Picone, Insurers, Manufacturers Agree to Set Up Facility to Provide Settlement
of Asbestos Disease Claims, INS. Anvoc., May 26, 1984 at 4, 22-23, col. 1.
48. The Pittsburgh Press, April 5, 1984 at 1, col. 1.
49. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
50. Tarnoff, supra note 20, at 21. The intent here is not to make light of suits which
were brought within the insurance industry itself. Primary insurers, excess insurers and
reinsurers also sued each other as a result of the asbestos claims. Id.
51. Id.
52. Zinkewicz, supra note 18, at 1A, col. 1.
53. Id.
54. Zinkewicz, Agreement Reached on Central Facility for Handling Asbestos Claims,
Vol. 24:833
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efficient was indeed dim.
B. The Burdensome Costs of the Asbestos Litigation
The potential liability of the asbestos problem has been esti-
mated to be in the billions of dollars. 5 More specifically, the Rand
Study indicated that the cost could go as high as 87 billion dol-
lars,56 as the largest contributor, the Manville Corporation (for-
merly Johns-Manville) was estimated to have liability between one
to two billion dollars or even as high as fifteen to thirty billion
dollars.57 The size of these estimates alone makes it clear why cor-
porations would want to cut costs and preserve insurance coverage
so as to avoid using corporate funds to pay verdicts, settlements
and legal fees. However, these figures were not the only reason why
some of those involved in asbestos litigation were prompted to look
for an alternative way to spend precious insurance coverage. They
were prompted as well by how the money was actually being
spent.5
8
Some part of the cost analysis problem dealt with the litigation
itself. One frequently cited example was that of an asbestos deposi-
tion at which as many as twenty defense attorneys would question
the same witness.59 It was often noted that many of these attorneys
would ask the same questions or, in fact, do nothing.60 These kinds
of activities were in large measure responsible for some estimates
that injured workers were getting as little as thirty-seven cents on
the dollar; the remaining sixty-three cents was being spent on legal
fees."1 One insurer concluded that it cost $95,000 to pay a plaintiff
$35,000.62
Moreover, three other factors indicated that money was being
misplaced or otherwise misused. First, there was a great deal of
inequity among the jurisdictions where cases were tried or set-
J. CoM. Nov. 7, 1984, at 15A, col. 1.
55. System to Settle Asbestos Claims Proposed by Firms, Wall St. J., April 4, 1984, at
1, col. 1.
56. Kakalik, Ebener, Felstiner & Shanley, Costs of Asbestos Litigation, RAND INSTI-
TUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (July, 1983).
57. Carpenter, Asbestos Litigation at Turning Point, J. Cohi, April 5, 1984, at 1A, col.
1.
58. See generally Backgrounder on the Asbestos Claims Facility (1984).
59. Tarnoff, supra note 20, at 21.
60. Id.
61. Kakalik, supra note 56.
62. Tarnoff, supra note 20, at 21.
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tled. 3 This led to the observation that two plaintiffs who worked
at the same place, were exposed to the same products, and had
essentially the same illness could get different amounts of money
by filing their suits in different courts.64 Second, there were exper-
ienced opinions that too many individuals without demonstrable
disease were getting awards.68 Finally, it was noted that none of
the estimates of the liability or costs of the litigation included any
of the money spent by the producers and insurers on the many
lawsuits that arose over insurance coverage 66
Therefore, two basic conclusions were reached. First, the asbes-
tos litigation was expensive, with too little of the money going to
the injured parties who deserved it. Second, additional money was
being spent, not to compensate victims, but to determine who
should compensate them. At base, there simply was not enough
money to perpetuate such a system.
C. The Failure or Inapplicability of Other Alternatives
Once the conclusion was reached by various producers that the
asbestos litigation was unmanageable, there appeared to be three
alternatives to the use of the tort system-workmen's compensa-
tion, bankruptcy proceedings or a private sector solution, 7 For the
reasons outlined below, it became evident that only the third alter-
native could function and at the same time accrue the most bene-
fits for the involved parties.
The first possible substitute for litigation of asbestos-related
bodily injury claims was workmen's compensation. Studies indi-
cated, however, that very few asbestos claimants were entitled to
disability under the existing systems.6 6 This was because of the rel-
atively high degrees of disability required by these systems.6 9 Fur-
ther, the courts offered a much more lucrative award to plaintiffs
than the relatively small stipends offered by workmen's compensa-
tion.70 The consensus was that, in reality, workmen's compensation
63. Backgrounder on the Asbestos Claims Facility (1984).
64. Id.
65. Address by Representative Erlenborn, Annual Government Briefing of the Insur-
ance Information Institute (June 19, 1984).
66. Tarnoff, Asbestos Coverage Pact, Claims Facility Negotiated, Bus. INS., April 9,
1984, at 1, col. 2.
67. See generally Address by Representative Erlenborn, Annual Government Briefing






was by-passed in favor of third party product liability actions. 71 It
is fair to say then that workmen's compensation did not fail but
simply was not used. As such, an unused alternative could not be
depended upon to handle the majority of asbestos claims.
The second alternative was bankruptcy. This method had been
chosen by a number of corporations as a way of dealing with the
asbestos claims.7 2 The most important example of this was the
Manville Corporation which was one of the most heavily involved
parties in the asbestos suits. 78 On August 26, 1982, forced by in-
creasingly successful and more frequent law suits, Manville applied
for reorganization under Chapter 11.74 At the time of filing, the
corporation was financially solvent, but claimed that it needed pro-
tection because it estimated that asbestos-related claims would
wipe out its assets of two billion dollars.7 5 However, some have
classified this as a "bold legal maneuver" that immediately
"blocked new suits, pending claims and executions on judg-
ments. '76 Regardless of the motives, the Manville bankruptcy
achieved these effects while the corporation continued in
business.7
Thus, it seemed that bankruptcy had the supposed effect of get-
ting some companies out from under the pressures of the asbestos
litigation. It had the effect of shielding a company while its assets
were being reorganized. However, there were two reasons why
bankruptcy could not be a general solution to the asbestos prob-
lem. First, each corporation was not an independent factor in the
litigation.78 Whether by choice or not, the defendants were closely
connected and what one did had an effect on the others.79 Second,
because no other alternative was viable (except litigation), a deluge
of bankruptcies would have meant that victims would initially get
very little compensation for valid claims and would have to wait,
perhaps many years, for the remainder of their compensation.8
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Debtor's Petition under Chapter 11, In re UNR Indus., No. 82B 90841
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. filed July 29, 1982).
73. See generally Riley, supra note 9, at 1.
74. Debtor's Petition Under Chapter 11, In Re Johns-Manville Corp., No. 82 BKey.
11656 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed August 26, 1982).
75. Id.
76. Riley, supra note 9, at 25.
77. Id.
78. Olick, Chapter 11-A Dubious Solution to Massive Toxic Tort Liability: A Ten-





Therefore, the majority of corporations concluded that while bank-
ruptcy might be a good individual solution or defensive strategy, it
could not be an overall remedy for the legal/social problem of as-
bestos injury. It was, as the possible solution of workmen's com-
pensation had been, eliminated as a workable solution to the as-
bestos crises, leaving only the possibility of private sector
resolution of the problem.
III. THE ASBESTOS CLAIMS FACILITY
With the foregoing problems concerning the asbestos situation in
mind, negotiations began in October of 1982 to achieve a private
sector solution to handle the asbestos-related claims.8' These nego-
tiations were under the auspices of New York's Center for Public
Resources, whose president was James F. Henry."2 The goals set
were to establish a Facility, solve the insurance coverage disputes
and develop a system of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).s3
During the first seventeen months of negotiations, the basics of the
Facility were formed from concepts that had been previously re-
viewed by the Asbestos Claims Council. 4 Also, the concept of a
Facility was one of the key proposals made to the group by the Los
Angeles consulting firm of Hamilton, Rabinowitz & Szanten. s5 In
short, the Hamilton proposal called for defendants (producers) and
their insurers to "charge one or more working-level groups with
preparation of a conceptual description, a financial plan, and to
draft Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws for a new non-profit
entity."86
The difficult talks were moderated by Harry Wellington, Dean of
the Yale Law School, from whom the popular name of "Wellington
Agreement" is derived.8 7 Basically, two groups of negotiators were
involved, a group of insurer representatives and a group of pro-
81. Principles of Agreement (Executed by representatives of producers and insurers,
Jan. 5, 1984 and Jan. 10, 1984) (Available in Duquesne University Law School Library).
82. Gilman, Asbestos Claims Facility Looms, May Starting Date Possible, NAT'L UN-
DERWRITER, April 13, 1984, at 1, 71. The Center for Public Resources is an effort by 130
corporations and 50 law firms to find alternatives to litigation. Id.
83. Press release (Released by producers and insurers, April 3, 1984).
84. Non-Profit Asbestos Claims Facility Proposed to Settle Asbestos Suits, 1 ASBEs-
TOS LITIGATION REP., 8061, 8062 (April 6, 1984). The Asbestos Claims Counsel was the group
of insurer representatives that considered problems in the asbestos litigation. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Press release (released by producers and insurers, April 3, 1984).
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ducer representatives. 8 In addition, from time to time, a number
of plaintiffs' attorneys were involved in the discussions.8 However,
because many of the questions related to the creation of the Facil-
ity were producer/insurer insurance questions, it became evident
that these two groups would have to meet without the plaintiffs'
representatives in order to first work out their differences.90 Thus,
the bulk of the negotiations were carried out by the producers and
insurers with ancillary groups to carry out related functions.9 1
Initially, the most important task was to clearly identify the is-
sues.92 The primary result of this was probably most succinctly put
by Dean Wellington who said, "No true solution to the underlying
tort litigation problems was possible . . . unless insurers and pro-
ducers could agree on what, in the end, comes down to the answers
to a single question: who pays for what?"9 Although that question
may now seem simple, those who participated say that the
problems were so complex and the self-interests of the participants
so diverse that they nearly defied solution. 4 Briefly stated, the
most difficult problems were related to the insurance coverage to
be afforded, coverage triggers, duty to defend, and deductibles.9 5 A
brief description of these and related problems will suffice to illus-
88. Id. The negotiators changed over time, but at the time of closing the insurance
negotiators were John F. Shea, Jr., of Aetna Life and Casualty Co., Claude Glaser, Jr., of
Hartford Insurance Group, James W. McMahon of CIGNA Corp., Edward T. Harris of Con-
tinental Insurance Co., Peter Shea of Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., and C. James Ayliffe
and Keith R. Rayment representing Lloyd's and The London Cos. Producer negotiators
were John L. Baldwin, president of Pittsburgh Corning Corp.; James J. Restivo, Jr. of Reed
Smith Shaw & McClay for Pittsburgh Coming Corp.; E. Judge Elderkin of Brobeck, Phleger
& Harrison for Fibreboard Corp., Scott D. Gilbert of Covington & Burling for Armstrong
World Industries; Daniel M. Phillips for Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.; Phillip McWeeney
for Owens-Illinois, Inc.; and Robert Emerton for Celotex Corp. Id.
89. Picone, supra note 47, at 23. Plaintiffs' attorneys included Fred Baron, Dallas,
Tex.; Paul Gillenwater, Knoxville, Tenn.; Thomas W. Henderson, Pittsburgh, Penn.; Stanley
J. Levy, New York City, N.Y.; Gene Locks, Philadelphia, Penn.; Ronald L. Motley, Charles-
ton, S.C.; Robert B. Steinberg, Los Angeles, Cal.; and Robert E. Sweeney, Cleveland, Ohio.
Id.
90. Zinkewicz, supra note 54, at 15A, col. 1.
91. Wellington: A Long, Difficult Settlement Process, 1 MEALEY's LMGATION REP.-
ASBESTOS 1942, 1944 (March 8, 1985). "In all, 16 producers and 12 insurers participated in
drawing up the Wellington draft, and the insurers footed the bill, paying for Wellington &
Dauer (his deputy dean), CPR, consultants. .. , [a) public relations agency ... and com-
puter studies." Id.
92. Lempert, supra note 29, at 4, col. 1.
93. McIntyre, Asbestos Facility's Moderator Pleads His Case to Executives, Bus. INS.,
Oct. 22, 1984, at 10, 12.
94. 1 MEALEY's LMGATION REP.-AsB.sTos, supra note 91, at 1944.
95. Shea, Principal Negotiators Discuss Proposed Insurance Agreement, 1 MEALEY'S
LITIGATION REP.-AsBESToS 560, 562, 566 (May 15, 1984).
Duquesne Law Review
trate the nature of the problems solved by the agreement. Basi-
cally, the problems fell into one of four categories: producer versus
insurer problems, insurer positions, producer positions and plain-
tiff positions.9 6
The producer versus insurer problems were probably the easiest
to see and, perhaps, the most difficult of resolution. The litigation
that had arisen between the two groups with regard to the cover-
age trigger theories caused a great deal of friction."' However,
there were still other cases that arose between producers and in-
surers with regard to the duty to defend issue. Producers claimed
that even though policy limits were exhausted, the duty to defend
continued as to ongoing cases: Insurers insisted that the duty to
defend ended when policy limits were gone.98 Both of these types
of litigation included claims of bad faith and for punitive dam-
ages.9 Moreover, most negotiations between individual producers
and insurers had broken down, leaving an air of anger and mistrust
between the parties. 00
The insurer positions were caused by the basic structure of the
insurance industry which made it very difficult for insurers to have
a cohesive position.' In general, some were primary carriers and
some were excess carriers. 02 The former had defense clauses in
their policies whereas the latter did not; this created different in-
terests. -3 Moreover, some insurers had per person deductibles that
they wanted to retain.
04
A primary carrier is an insurer who writes the initial coverage on
a risk.10 5 These insurers not only have a duty to indemnify their
policyholders, but also have to provide defense costs which do not
deplete their liability limits. 0 6 By comparison, an excess carrier
writes additional layers of coverage on a risk.10 7 The excess policies
96. Zinkewicz, supra note 54, at 15A, col. 1.
97. See supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 553 F. Supp.
425 (E.D. Pa. 1981), modified, 609 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. Pa. 1985), appeal docketed, Nos. 85-
1450 and 85-1486 (3d Cir. filed Aug. 1, 1985).
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normally do not have defense obligations and, if they do, the de-
fense costs reduce indemnity limits.10 8 Furthermore, there are rein-
surers that take part of the risk from both primary and excess car-
riers but do not have any contractual relations (defense
obligations) with the policyholders.10 9 This structure created vary-
ing interests that were brought to the negotiations leading to the
Agreement. Because of high defense costs, some primary insurers
had an interest in exhausting their indemnity limits quickly where
the defense obligation was tied to indemnity.110 However, excess
carriers did not want this for it resulted in the obligation to pay
sooner.' In other words, if the excess carrier had no defense obli-
gation, it was bound to be less concerned about litigation costs
than the primary carrier. 112 Finally, since reinsurers did not have
to pay until the earlier layers of coverage were expended, they
wanted the first layers of coverage to last as long as possible. 1 3
Per claim deductibles in asbestos policies were like the familiar
deductibles in home owner's and automobile policies. Some of the
policies required that the policyholder first pay a set amount on a
particular claim before the insurer would pay the remainder of the
claim. These deductibles were another way in which some insurers
reduced their monetary obligations in the asbestos litigation, thus,
their position was to retain them."4
The producers also had positions which were difficult to recon-
cile. Initially, "the producers ...had nothing in common except
the asbestos litigation in both the underlying tort cases and the
coverage cases" and "[t]hey had different policies and different ap-
proaches to deal with these things.""11 5 Essentially, there developed
three producer positions which were in conflict. First, the defend-
ant producers in the underlying tort litigation were deeply divided
between litigation, bankruptcy or the Facility. Second, the produc-
ers were divided in the method of calculating their portion of lia-
bility, as that calculation would determine the percentage to be
paid in all future settlements. Third, the producers' attitudes and
priorities were influenced by the amount of insurance and coverage
108. Id. There can be hundreds of reinsurers on a risk. Id.






115. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 91, at 1942.
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that they had. Producers whose insurance coverage was only short
term would have different priorities from producers who had long
term coverage. 16
Therefore, philosophy, liability share and insurance coverage dif-
fered among producers. The most sensitive of these was the liabil-
ity share issue. 17 Many producers had been historically secretive
about the amounts that they had paid for settlements and were
reluctant to share this information with other producers, let alone
insurers other than their own.118 The reason was essentially that
market share value was used to determine proportionate liability.
Producers, therefore, did not want to admit their actual shares if
they had been paying less than their market share, because to do
so might lead to a greater liability share if an agreement could not
be reached.119
Problems also arose when the plaintiffs' attorneys became in-
volved. These attorneys had to answer to two separate entities.
120
On the one hand they had to protect the rights of their clients,
whereas on the other they had to consider the wishes of their col-
leagues in the plaintiffs' bar. 21
Thus, there were conflicts on all fronts. To the credit of those
involved, however, after seventeen months of negotiations an an-
nouncement was made that an agreement was ready for considera-
tion. 1 22 In effect, the tentative Agreement did three things. First, it
settled all of the issues between the producers and insurers.1 21 Sec-
ond, it provided a means to get the thousands of asbestos-related
bodily injury cases out of the courts. 2 4 Third, it gave formulas to
allocate the liability among the producers. 2 5 The tentative Agree-
ment was then sent to 200 companies for review.'26 Finally, after
an additional number of months (making the total time over three
116. Zinkewicz, supra note 54, at 15A.
117. 1 MEALEY's LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 104, at 1939.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 91, at 1942.
121. Id. Basically, in attempting to procure the most favorable settlement for their
clients, plaintiffs' attorneys also had to ensure that their fellow colleagues' positions would
not be hampered by the settlement. Id.
122. Press Release of Asbestos Companies and Major Insurers (April 3, 1984).
123. Pittsburgh Press, supra note 12, at 1, col. 1.
124. Id.
125. Tarnoff, Asbestos Producers Mulling Agreement, Bus. INs., May 28, 1984 at 1,
col. 1, 79, col. 1.
126. Insurance Settlement Proposal Sent to 200 Potential Subscribers, 1 MEALEY'S
LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS 535 (May 25, 1984).
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years) of review, revision and persuasion, the Agreement Concern-
ing Asbestos-Related Claims was executed.127
At this writing, it is not possible to outline exactly how the Fa-
cility will function because there are certain policies that have not
as yet been completely formulated within the Agreement. There-
fore, to do so would be an exercise in supposition. It is possible,
however, to consider seven categories that are being and will be
treated under the Agreement. These are: the goals of the Facility;
the benefits that will accrue to those involved with the Facility; the
basic structure of the Facility; claims handling under the Agree-
ment; cost handling under the Agreement; the handling of in-
traperspective and extraperspective problems by the Facility; and
the addition of new members to the Facility.
A. Goals of the Facility
The goals of the Facility can be generally stated to include the
solution of the problems that became associated with asbestos ex-
posure and the resulting bodily injury claims that arose, at least
with respect to the signatories to the Agreement.12" More specifi-
cally, they can be stated as
[T]he encouragement and facilitation of negotiated settlements; the promo-
tion of fair, consistent and timely resolutions of asbestos-related claims; the
establishment of an efficient and cost-effective method of processing asbes-
tos claims; the encouragement of resolution of disputes through non-judicial
procedures; and the encouragement of waiver of punitive damage claims, at
the earliest practicable time.2 9
In order to accomplish these goals, the signatories to the Agree-
ment are in the process of establishing the Facility as a private
sector entity which, in reality, will be an independent, non-profit
corporation."' 0 The Facility will provide incentives to encourage
settlements and disincentives to discourage the use of the tort sys-
tem as a means of resolving asbestos-related bodily injury
claims. 3 ' It is planned that the goals be reached by: providing
plaintiffs with a faster and more equitable means of compensation;
removing the inequality in settlements by providing a central filing
place for claims; reducing the legal costs of both plaintiffs and de-
127. See generally Agreement Concerning Asbestos-Related Claims (June 19, 1985).
128. See generally Section II of this comment.
129. Picone, supra note 47, at 22-23.
130. Backgrounder on the Asbestos Claims Facility (1984).
131. Picone, supra note 47, at 23.
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fendants by encouraging settlements; ending the insurance cover-
age disputes by providing comprehensive coverage from exposure
through manifestation; and allowing the producers and insurers to
manage liabilities in such a way as to allow future planning.1
32
Since the signing of the Agreement, those in control of the Facility
have been moving forward to meet these goals and, despite the is-
sues and/or problems that have been raised, 33 progress has been
made.
34
B. The Benefits of the Facility
Assuming that the Facility will meet its goals, there are four
groups that will benefit from proper use of the Facility. These
groups are claimants, insurers, producers and the courts with at-
tendant benefits to society.
The most important benefit to be gained by an injured worker
will be that the use of the Facility is on an entirely voluntary basis
with the claimant having recourse to the tort system at every
step. '3 While the use of the tort system will be discouraged by the
Facility, this notion ensures that the claimant will have his full
range of constitutional rights up to the point where he has reached
an agreement concerning the value of his case. In addition, claim-
ants will benefit because the use of the Facility will avoid the delay
caused by the backlogged court dockets and will afford the claim-
ant a single place to settle with all of the producers who are signa-
tories to the Agreement.' Thus, a victim will be able to more
quickly receive compensation, which is often significant to a dis-
abled individual who is impaired to the point that he has lost his
capacity to earn income. Moreover, it is hoped that the Facility
will achieve more or less standard settlement values for similarly
situated claimants and that it will remove the rigors and difficul-
ties often encountered by impaired individuals who have to sit
through a long trial. 3 7 Finally, for claimants with little or no im-
pairment or dysfunction, the Facility will offer a deferral program
whereby it will agree to waive the applicable statute of limitations
until (if at all) the claimant's condition worsens. Should such a
132. Backgrounder on the Asbestos Claims Facility (1984).
133. See infra notes 200-65 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
135. 7 CLAIMS REP., supra note 30, at 02-1592.
136. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-AsBESTOS, supra note 95, at 563. See also 1 MEALEY'S
LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 126, at 536.
137. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 126, at 567.
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happenstance occur, the claimant will be able to reapply for an
award.
13 8
In summary, the individual with an asbestos-related injury can
expect his claim to be resolved in a much quicker and more effi-
cient manner. However, there is one caveat that needs to be men-
tioned. The submission of a claim to the Facility does not auto-
matically mean that the individual will receive damages. A
claimant will still have to demonstrate that he suffers from an as-
bestos-related disease with some level of dysfunction. 39 This, how-
ever, is no more or less than one could or should expect when un-
dertaking a lawsuit and, at least to many, does not severely restrict
the concept of the Facility. 4"
Insurers who have signed the Agreement will enjoy benefits as
well. There are essentially five benefits. First, the Agreement pro-
vides for the resolution of all of the existing coverage suits in
which signing producers and insurers are involved."" This is and
will be accomplished by dismissals in the pending declaratory
judgment actions.1 42 Second, the dismissals also remove the ex-
pense and insurance personnel time involved in these suits.143
Third, since the dismissals are with prejudice, they also remove the
threat of punitive damages from insurers.1' Fourth, there will be
attendant in-house savings with respect to claims handling because
one attorney can do the work that was previously done by many in
cases that eventually went to trial."15 Finally, most non-aggregate
policies will be capped under the Agreement.'" 6 Overall, these ben-
efits will save insurers time and money and give them some sense
of certainty as to how coverage dollars will be spent.
Before moving on to the benefits that will be received by produc-
138. 7 CLAIMS REP., supra note 30, at 02-1592. In Facility parlance this concept is
known as a "Green Card."
139. Gannon, Claims Panel May Reduce Asbestos Jam, Pittsburgh Business Times,
April 9-15, 1984, at 1, col. 1, 43, col. 1.
140. But see the complaints about this infra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
141. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 95, at 560. See also 1 MEALEY's
LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 126, at 535.
142. Special Edition-Asbestos Claims Facility, 1 ASBESTOS LITIGATION REP. 8356 (May
18, 1984).
143. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 95, at 560. See also 1 MEALEY'S
LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 126, at 535.
144. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-AsBEsTos, supra note 95, at 560.
145. Id. According to Mr. John Shea of Aetna Life & Casualty, because, under the
terms of the Facility, the producers will have agreed to a percentage share of liability, theo-





ers who have signed the Agreement, it is necessary to consider one
area which will equally benefit both the insurers and the produc-
ers. In addition to providing for the dismissal of the coverage suits,
the Agreement also provides for a system of Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) to handle any coverage dispute that may arise in
the future between the subscribers to the Facility. 1 7 This will no
doubt save both producers and insurers considerable time and
money by avoiding excess litigation and should be considered as a
plus to both sides.
The producers who have signed the Agreement will be further
benefited. Most importantly, they will receive the broad coverage
that they sought in the insurance litigation and a more cost-effi-
cient way of handling the claims.1 8 The former gives "comprehen-
sive coverage" for an "exposure period" that begins on the first
date of exposure to the asbestos-containing product(s) of a pro-
ducer until manifestation of an asbestos-related disease."14 The lat-
ter means that the insurance coverage will be spent more reasona-
bly. 50 Also as regards insurance coverage, "producers will be able
to select a date between 1973 and 1979, and all policies prior to
that date will then constitute a block of coverage for payment
before a producer has to apply payments to policies written in pro-
tective years.'5' This will allow the producers to use all policies
that provided "true coverage" before they have to make payments
from their own resources.15 2 Moreover, they will be allowed to add
sequential years to the block when they so desire. 53 These insur-
ance coverage provisions will allow producers to utilize efficiently
the insurance coverage that they bought and for which they paid,
with the result that corporate funds will be protected from use in
asbestos litigation. The latter point will also help to avoid bank-
ruptcy and its concomitant effects on other defendants and claim-
ants. Finally, the signatories to the Agreement will be able to have
a unified defense when recourse to the tort system is necessary.'
54
Thus, the thirty-six producers will be able to do with one law firm
what had historically been accomplished through the use of per-
147. Picone, supra note 47, at 22.
148. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 126, at 536.
149. Id. at 535.
150. Id. at 536.
151. Picone, supra note 47, at 22.
152. Id. This will avoid the use of policies that were protectively written by insurers to
avoid the large payments that resulted from the asbestos litigation. Id.
153. Id.
154. 7 CLAIMS REP., supra note 30 at 02-1592.
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haps thirty-six law firms. 155 Again, the cost savings will be evident
and will provide more funds from which to pay deserving
claimants.
Lastly, there are benefits from the Agreement that will flow to
the courts and society in general. Courts should benefit from the
Facility's emphasis on settlement through negotiation and the
ADR process because these notions will take many of the cases out
of the already overburdened court systems. 156 Further, it has been
suggested that, if the Facility is successful, it may well become a
role model for other major areas of dispute in toxic torts such as
Agent Orange, DES and waste disposal.157 Once the Facility is
functional, the former will undoubtedly be true. The latter is cer-
tainly a matter of supposition at this time. However, if the Facility
is successful and if other areas of toxic torts reach the proportion
of the asbestos litigation, it seems logical that the pattern would be
followed. Nevertheless, the effort to offer a private sector solution
as embodied in the Agreement is commendable as an effort to im-
prove society even if the idea does not branch out.
C. The Basic Structure and Functions of the Facility
The Facility's offices will be operated by professionals hired by
the subscribing producers and insurers and will be managed by a
Board of Directors consisting of an equal number of each.1 58 Mem-
bership will be open to all producers and insurers who subscribe to
the Agreement and carries with it the obligation to cooperate with
the Facility. 59 The Facility will have the power to evaluate, settle,
pay or defend all asbestos-related bodily injury claims against all
members.6 0 Moreover, it will act as liaison for all members with
non-members and will also arrange ADR for problems which may
arise between subscribing members.' 6'
155. Historically, there were some manufacturers that were able to share counsel with
other manufacturers. However, the situation was still such that most manufacturers had to
have representation in each jurisdiction where there were pending cases. Therefore, a great
deal of insurance coverage was expended to pay the resulting legal bills (Private corporate
records).
156. 1 MEALEY's LMGATON REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 95, at 564.
157. Tarnoff, supra note 66, at 56, col. 2.
158. Picone, supra, note 47, at 22. At this writing, offices of the Facility will have their
headquarters in Princeton, N.J. and there will be a branch office near San Francisco, Cal.
Quincy, Massachusetts Standard, Sept. 6, 1985, at 1, col. A.





Each asbestos-related bodily injury claim will be handled for all
members by the Facility."6 2 It will neither settle claims in part nor
will it settle claims on behalf of some but not all members. 6 3 And,
it will neither pay punitive damages in settlement nor will it settle
any case in such a fashion as to leave open the issue of punitive
damages in a tort case.'64
D. Claims Handling by the Facility
Although the exact procedures for claims handling under the
agreement are not known at this time, the Facility will provide for
this in a broad manner. One very important aspect of claims han-
dling by the Facility is that there will not be a predetermined
schedule of benefits for claimants. 6 This is to say that the Facility
will evaluate cases on a claim-by-claim basis.6 6 Thus, each case
will be treated on its own merits and will not simply be placed in
an arbitrary classification. This will preserve the individual claim-
ant's rights.
The Facility will provide its own forms for submitting claims. 6
These forms will require that a claimant provide certain standard
information such as employment, medical and compensation his-
tory. ' 8 This information will then be used to determine whether or
not the claim is eligible for Facility handling.6 " Eligibility will re-
quire that the claimant show that he was exposed to the products
of at least one Facility member and that he has an asbestos-related
condition,'7 0 defined by radiographic changes or breathing abnor-
malities.17 ' If the claim is eligible for Facility handling, settlement
will be attempted by evaluating whether there is an asbestos-re-
lated physical impairment and dysfunction and whether there is
any liability of a Facility member. 7 2 The evaluation of liability will
include any available defenses and setoffs (such as prepaid settle-




165. Tarnoff, supra note 125, at 1, 79.
166. Carpenter, supra note 57, at 1A, col. 1.
167. Picone, supra note 47, at 22, col. 1.
168. Id.
169. Backgrounder on the Asbestos Claims Facility (1984).
170. Id.




fered. 17 If, however, settlement cannot be reached, the Facility
will offer a full range of mediation to promote non-judicial resolu-
tion.174 If a resolution to the claim fails, a joint defense will be pro-
vided for all members.
175
The above notions, coupled with the possibilities of resort to the
tort system and reapplication to the Facility when and if a claim-
ant's health worsens, 176 should ensure that all individuals who take
their claims to the Facility will be treated fairly.
E. Cost Handling Under the Agreement
The "coverage block" concept for funding the Facility was men-
tioned above as a benefit to producers.17 7 Basically, the coverage
block provided by the subscribing insurers will provide indemnity
and defense costs coverage to the subscribing producers.178 Gener-
ally, by the use of predetermined allocation formulas, the Agree-
ment will spread liability for a given claim first among all produc-
ers. Then, for each producer, liability will be spread over all of the
insurance policies that that producer had from exposure through
manifestation of a resulting injury.17 9 The coverage block will not
be exhausted on a policy-by-policy basis but rather on a total basis
for the block, each block representing a particular year of
exposure. 8 °
Specifically, liability and expenses will be allocated to each pro-
ducer member.' 8' These allocations will establish the responsibility
of each producer for a percentage of the expenses for each claim
handled on its behalf by the Facility.182 According to the proposed
formula, those producers that have been sued most frequently and
who have paid out the most in indemnity will continue to bear the
largest shares of the liability.'" The formula takes into account
the number of claims paid or owing [for each producer], the amount of in-
demnity paid or owing and the number of open claims as of September 30,
1983, plus any new claims reported to the producer or the asbestos facility
173. Id.
174. Backgrounder on The Asbestos Claims Facility (1984).
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
178. 1 ASBESTOs LITIGATION REP., supra note 142, at 8356.
179. Lempert, supra note 29, at 1, col. 1.
180. Tarnoff, supra note 125, at 1.
181. Picone, supra note 47, at 22.
182. Id.
183. Tarnoff, supra note 125, at 79, col. 3.
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for the period from October 1, 1983, until one year after the opening of the
facility.""
Moreover, the apportionment takes into account that in some
states claims have historically been paid at higher amounts.185
An example is illustrative of how this will work on a per-claim
basis. Assume that Producer A's allocated share is 10% and that a
claim is settled for $200,000. This will mean that Producer A's in-
surers will have to pay $20,000. Thus, if Producer A's coverage
block covers ten years and includes ten different insurers, each in-
surer will have to pay one-tenth of the $20,000 or $2,000.
Finally, each producer will get credit at the Facility for any set-
tlement or judgment paid prior to the start-up of the Facility.186
These monies will be reallocated into the sharing formulas to give
another measure of equitable treatment to the subscribing produc-
ers and insurers.
187
F. Facility Handling of Intraperspective and Extraperspective
Problems
One of the key components of the Facility is the means provided
by the Agreement to resolve issues that may arise between its
members. 18 To resolve these issues, the Agreement allows for a pe-
riod of negotiation.18 ' If this fails, however, a series of steps is pro-
vided which will keep certain issues out of the court system. 190
First, there are quasi-judicial proceedings which are to take place
under the direction of a presiding trial judge picked from a stand-
ing panel. In this process, both parties are to file briefs and engage
in a limited five-day discovery period followed by a limited trial. If
the trial judge's decision is not acceptable to either party, there
will then be steps leading to an appeal before a three-judge appel-
late panel (also picked from a standirng panel). The issues handled
by the ADR are designated as either binding, in which case the
decision will be final as decided by the appellate panel, or non-
184. Id.
185. Id. The states treated as "major states" by the Agreement are Pennsylvania, Cali-
fornia, Texas, Washington, Virginia, New Jersey, Mississippi and Connecticut. All others are
considered to be non-major. See Agreement Concerning Asbestos-Related Claims (June 19,
1985).
186. Picone, supra note 125, at 22.
187. Id.
188. See Agreement Concerning Asbestos-Related Claims, supra note 185, at VIII.
See also supra note 144 and accompanying text.




binding, in which case the parties will have recourse to the judicial
system.191
The importance of ADR is that it will give subscribing producers
and insurers a means of avoiding protracted litigation among
themselves. Moreover, it will promote the policies of the Facility
by saving time and money which can be better spent in the resolu-
tion of eligible claims. With respect to extraperspective disputes,
the Facility will act as liaison for its members with non-members
such as other asbestos defendants or the United States Govern-
ment.192 In addition, the Facility will have the right to pursue
these non-members as third parties in the litigation. 193 However,
the Agreement stresses that there is no obligation on the part of
the Facility to pursue such action.194 Thus, these are left as mat-
ters to be handled when necessary in particular circumstances.
G. New Members
As a final note to the proposed functioning of the Facility, a few
statements about new membership are in order. The opportunity
for producers and insurers to become members of the Facility not
only exists but, with certain exceptions, is also encouraged. 9 5 Any
company that is in reorganization under Chapter 11 may sign on or
before December 31, 1986 without further steps. 9 6 All others, how-
ever, must be approved by the Board of Directors. 19 Further, any
late signatory must pay its share of all costs and attorney fees in-
curred after the June 19, 1985 signing."8 Finally, the terms of the
Agreement may not totally apply to the late signers unless ap-
proved specifically by the subscribing members.199
Since these conditions are not preclusive, it is expected that new
members will sign as the Facility progresses. In fact, some have
already done so which indicates that the concept is gaining accept-
ance as it is being implemented.20 0
191. Id.
192. Picone, supra note 125, at 22.
193. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 95, at 563.
194. Id.
195. Wellington Board Interviews Candidates, Eyes Facility Progress, 1 MEALEY'S
LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS 3019 (Oct. 11, 1985).
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IV. REACTIONS TO THE FACILITY
Obviously, the creation of so sweeping and different an alterna-
tive as the Facility has elicited a great number of reactions, both
positive and negative. The Agreement has been lauded as the "best
available solution to the most serious toxic tort litigation, and in-
surance coverage problems ever to confront our courts and the in-
surance business. "201 Generally, those who support the Facility
look upon it as a voluntary process that will cut time and costs and
which will afford deserving claimants faster relief by circumventing
long court battles.0 2 Some applaud the Facility because it offers a
way for producers and insurers to put aside their litigation
problems and get on with the business of compensating victims.20 3
Even those who are somewhat more guarded in their reactions re-
alize that the Facility is at least available which, in their view,
makes it the only viable alternative to litigation. 20 ' These individu-
als recognize that if the Facility is not "perceived as fair," workers
who develop cancer or other asbestos-related illnesses will not use
it and will continue the "expensive route through the court-
room." 20 5 This feeling of fairness will ultimately determine the suc-
cess or failure of the Facility.
There have been various other comments concerning and reac-
tions to the Facility, some negative, some simply questioning.
First, there has been some concern over whether there are enough
signatories to the Agreement to make it feasible. Those who ex-
press this concern have flatly concluded that more signatories are
needed to "resolve the asbestos coverage litigation and for the
claims-handling facility ultimately to succeed."20 6 This, however,
has not dissuaded the members from going forward and the Facil-
ity exists in spite of this observation.20 7
A second and closely related area centers on the reason why vari-
ous producers and insurers have chosen not to sign the Agreement.
A great deal of concern has been expressed because the Manville
Corporation, historically the largest defendant in the asbestos liti-
201. Opinions-Asbestos Agreement is Best Option, Bus. INS., Aug. 27, 1984, at 6.
202. Greene, supra note 25, at 154.
203. Opinions-Don't Give Up the Fight, BUS.INs., Oct. 22, 1984, at 8, col. 1.
204. Bus. INS., Aug. 27, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
205. Young, Organized Labor Skeptical About Asbestos Facility, J. COM., March 20,
1985 at 1A, col. 1.
206. Opinions-Only a Beginning, Bus. INS., July 1, 1985, at 8, col. 1.
207. See, e.g., Wellington Settlements Remain Extremely Active, 1 MEALEY'S LITIGA-
TION REP.-ASBESTos 2917 (Sept. 27, 1985).
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gation, has thus far refused to join the Facility.208 Nevertheless,
this problem may be larger in theory than in practice since
Manville's Chapter 11 status has caused it to be absent since 1982.
Yet, other producers and their insurers have gone forward without
that corporation in the litigation and, also, the Facility has been
created without its participation." 9
Further, Manville has given reasons why it has chosen not to
enter into the Agreement. Basically, Manville representatives have
taken the position that the federal government should legislate a
solution to the asbestos problem, the creation of the Facility not-
withstanding.2 10 They feel that the government, as an employer in
the U.S. Naval Shipyards, produced the largest number of claim-
ants and, therefore, would escape liability through the Facility's
solution. 11 To bolster this argument they condemn the voluntary
nature of the Facility because it gives no assurance that it will be
used by claimants. Moreover, they believe that the Agreement is
flawed because it does not address plaintiff's attorney's contingent
fees, does not give a set schedule of benefits and because it allows
escape to the court system. 212 Thus, the Manville representatives
feel that all of these factors should be handled by legislative ac-
tion.21 3 Nevertheless, their position ignores the simple fact that the
government has failed to pass legislation with less stringent re-
quirements than they will accept.21 4 Decades more might pass
before this becomes a reality, and such legislation, completely pre-
cluding a right to court action, might well be open to constitutional
challenges.
215
Whether or not Manville's major insurer has refused to sign the
Agreement because of its connection with the corporation is a mat-
ter of supposition. However, Manville's major insurer has indicated
that it does not agree with Agreement insurance positions on cov-
erage, etc., because their standard policies are written otherwise.218
208. Costs of Asbestos Litigation, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE (July, 1983).
209. Id.




214. Abramowitz, Manville Chief Claims Bum Rap, Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1985,
at 1, col. A.
215. Id. Recently there have been indications that Manville might create its own "fa-
cility." Id.
216. Bulletin, MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-AsBESTOs, April 4, 1984, at 1 (these state-
ments were made by a Traveler's representative).
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Moreover, its representatives have stated that they would not and
could not join the group until all of their coverage litigation is
completed. 217 While these are, perhaps, valid short-term positions,
they neither handle the asbestos problem nor do they look to more
than a future of continued insurance litigation. As shown by the
dismal history of asbestos litigation, the better view is concession,
not advocacy.21
There have been other reasons for not subscribing to the Agree-
ment given by other manufacturers and insurers. First, some pro-
ducers' reasons were listed in a statement made by a Raymark
(formerly Raybestos-Manhattan) official:
Wellington (the agreement) is an untested experiment with many questions
remaining unanswered . . . . Yet, the price for participation is concession to
the Agreement's insurance settlement terms, the complete, irrevocable for-
feiture of all rights against the carriers, and the permanent lock-in of the
entire inventory of pending cases, all without any assurance of the ultimate
success of the facility.
219
Other companies claim that they have broader coverage than that
afforded by the Facility'2  or that they have viable punitive dam-
ages claims against their insurers for wrongfully withholding cover-
age. 21 On the insurer's side, some have been hesitant to sign be-
cause they have not received assurances that their reinsurers would
pay under the new plan.222 Others have been dissuaded because
the asbestos-related property damage issues are not included in
the Agreement.2 23 Still others, particularly reinsurers, have been
reluctant because they have not been consulted or because they
have been concerned about financing a radically new program in
the face of other rising responsibilities. 22' Again, these may be
valid short-term positions, but severe problems sometimes require
drastic change for the long run and, as previously noted, tradi-
tional positions have failed to solve the asbestos problem. More-
over, not everyone could be included in the discussions and the
Facility is continuing to consider the related issue of property
damage.223
217. Id.
218. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
219. Tarnoff, 28 Tentatively Sign Asbestos Pact, Bus. INs., July 30, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
220. Bus. INs., supra note 204, at 6.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-AsBESTOS, supra note 104, at 1938.
224. Shapiro, Asbestos Pact Isn't for Reinsurers, Bus. INs., June 10, 1985, at 24, col. 1.
225. Private corporate records. The property damage issues involve suits filed because
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A third type of reaction has come from the insurance coverage
litigation. Concern has been expressed that not all of the insurance
coverage litigation will be solved because not all parties to it have
signed the Agreement22 or because those producers who have
signed will continue to litigate against their insurers who have not
signed.22 7 Idealistically, all of these suits should be resolved, but
this is not immediately possible and a complete condemnation of
the Facility for not doing so is not only unfair but ignores the fact
that the reduction in the number of defendants and plaintiffs in
the cases will reduce costs and allow the insurance cases to be com-
pleted sooner. 228 This small measure of relief is better than none
given the protracted coverage litigation.
Fourth, claimants have been relatively silent concerning the Fa-
cility. However, there have been some statements to the effect that
they are suspicious of the Agreement.2 " Given the long-standing
adversarial positions of claimants with respect to those who have
signed the Agreement, this is not surprising and the suspicion will
not be removed until such time as plaintiffs have had a chance to
deal with the Facility. However, more significant reactions have
come from representatives of claimants-specifically unions and
plaintiffs' attorneys.
The comments that have been made by representatives of the
AFL-CIO are typical of unions' reactions to the Facility.2 30 Chief
among their concerns was that the Facility would use its harmony
to present a unified front against the victims of asbestos-related
disease.23 Moreover, they were skeptical about the criteria for
evaluating claims, the nature of awards and whether the monies
saved as a result of the Agreement would go to the claimants.23 2
They even went so far as to imply that the Facility is a way to
wage a war against the plaintiffs.3 Other observers, however, were
highly critical of these reactions because they felt that union mem-
asbestos products were used in public buildings such as schools.
226. Bus. INS., supra note 206, at 8, col. 1.
227. Tarnoff, Wellington Settles Few Coverage Suits, Bus. INs., July 1, 1985, at 1, col.
1, 25, col. 1.
228. Id. at 25, col. 1.
229. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, supra note 10, at 1, col. A.
230. See, e.g., Sugawara, supra note 11, at 1, col. 1.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Tarnoff, AFL-CIO Says It's "Uneasy" Over Wellington Agreement, Bus. INS.,
March 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1, 8, col. 1.
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bers deserved more objective guidance.2 3 They categorized the
union's positions as inflexible and completely negative toward any
proposals made by management and were particularly opposed to
the additional union opinion that litigation is the best approach
because its high costs force settlements.235 Thus, the union posi-
tions were said to comprise a "knee jerk" reaction, simply designed
to be opposed to stated Facility policies without an in-depth analy-
sis of those policies.23 6
Of all groups, plaintiffs' attorneys have had the most to say
about the Facility. Their reactions have been very frequent and
range from very positive to very negative. Their positions can be
outlined in five general categories. First, there have been many
positive, general comments made by plaintiffs' attorneys concern-
ing the Facility. Some of them have gone so far as to categorize the
Agreement as the "single most important thing that's happened in
asbestos litigation .... ,,237 The reasons for such a sweeping state-
ment are several, but basically they stem from the perception by
some members of the plaintiffs' bar that the Facility process will
be cheaper, faster and fairer than litigation, without precluding lit-
igation if the process does not work.238 Moreover, they understand
that claims can be filed at the Facility without filing lawsuits which
will avoid statute of limitations problems for some of their cli-
ents.2 3 9 Plaintiffs' attorneys also look to the resolution of insurance
litigation as a benefit to their clients in that they feel it will help to
free settlement funds.240 Finally, they favor the notion of a "one-
stop" location for settlement because it will resolve a major prob-
lem that they perceive in the litigation-that of having to deal
with a multiplicity of defense attorneys.24 1 They feel that this will
ease the difficulty in constructing settlements.1
42
Second, some plaintiffs' attorneys have made relatively negative
comments about the prospect of the Facility. Frequently, this has
been in the expression of a guarded stance toward the Facility.
2' 3
234. Opinions-Wellington Deserves Better, Bus. INS., April 1, 1985 at 8, col. 1.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Riley, supra note 9, at 25, col. 1.
238. Wall Street Journal, supra note 36, at 1, col. 1.
239. Tarnoff, supra note 66, at 56, col. 3.
240. Mixed Sentiments Expressed About Wellington Proposal, 1 MEALEY'S LITIGA-
TION REP.-ASBESTOS 659, 661 (June 8, 1984).
241. Lempert, supra note 29, at 4.
242. Riley, supra note 9, at 26, col. 1.
243. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 91, at 1943.
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In some senses, this reaction is caused by the suspicion that the
signatories to the Agreement may use their unity to get leverage in
trials or settlement negotiations of asbestos claims.2 "' This position
is compounded by those portions of the Agreement which rule out
punitive damages and settlements with individual signatories.
2 8
Even though the former have been included in only fourteen per-
cent of asbestos verdicts and less than one percent of out-of-court
settlements," 6 their loss is viewed by some of the plaintiffs' bar as
a reduction in settlement values.2 47 The latter causes some mem-
bers to claim that it limits their cases financially because they will
no longer be able to use settlement money from one defendant to
pursue another defendant.24 8 These fears are exacerbated by the
notion that the Facility was put together by a common desire not
to pay any money on the cases.24 Finally, these plaintiffs' lawyers
have a sense that they simply do not know what has been done or
what, if anything, will be done to their satisfaction.260 Neverthe-
less, after assessing the situation, these same lawyers should see
that once the Facility's policies are fully implemented, the benefits
will outweigh their fears.
Third, there have been some relatively neutral responses by
claimants' lawyers about the Facility. Generally those amount to a
wait-and-see attitude 51 and a sense that some of them are willing
to listen to what the Facility has to offer.2 52 Other observers have
made similar comments but have cautioned that there is a need to
bridge the gap with the plaintiffs' attorneys because their coopera-
tion is necessary to the Facility's success. 2 53 Steps are being taken
to accomplish this and it is hoped that mutual cooperation can be
achieved.
2 5 4
Fourth, one aspect of proposed claims handling by the Facility
has caused an ongoing controversy with members of the plaintiffs'
bar. The specific aspect is that the Agreement requires physical
244. Riley, Plaintiff's Bar Wary of Asbestos Accord, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1985, at 3.
245. Id. at 60.
246. Kuntz, supra note 3, at 83.
247. Riley, supra note 244, at 60.
248. Id.
249. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 240, at 661.
250. Motley, Commentary-Plaintiff's Attorney Views Wellington, 1 MEALEY'S LITGA-
TION REP.-ASBESTOS 2431, 2433 (July 1, 1985).
251. Riley, supra note 244, at 60.
252. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-AsBEsTos, supra note 91, at 1946.
253. Bus. INS., supra note 206, at 8, col. 1.
254. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
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impairment and dysfunction before a claim will be considered for
settlement by the Facility.25 Thus, the issue focuses on whether
the Facility will be willing to compensate claimants who show evi-
dence of asbestos exposure, but whose pulmonary functions are
normal thereby causing no impairment of their ability to earn a
living.25 1 Historically, some jurisdictions have allowed compensa-
tion for those types of injuries and some plaintiffs' lawyers contend
that disallowing compensation in these situations is an interference
with particular claimants' rights. 7 As a result, some of these at-
torneys have taken a hard line saying that they will refuse to take
claims to the Facility absent compensation for these types of inju-
ries.2 58 There are two reasons, however, why this need not be the
case. First, the Facility will allow these types of individuals to re-
turn to have their claims reconsidered if their health worsens. 59
Second, it is not certain whether these positions will be or even can
be divided by bright lines.26 0 Thus, this is a controversy which
should be softened by the passage of time.
The fifth, and perhaps most serious, response by plaintiffs' attor-
neys involves raising some antitrust issues against the Facility.2
At this writing, such a suit has been filed and awaits decision by a
Federal District Court in Ohio. 6 The suit charges that the Agree-
ment violates federal antitrust and monopoly laws with its central
focus directed at the notion that the Facility operates as an exclu-
sive agent for all of the signatories to the Agreement.26" It is
claimed that this violates claimants' rights to settle individually
with asbestos producers and that the plan retards the progress of
all settlements.2 " In addition, the plaintiff has leveled charges that
the Wellington plan is simply a product of the signatories' greed
for cost reduction without regard to the notion that the Facility
255. Agreement Concerning Asbestos-Related Claims, supra note 185, at I VII, cl. 5.
256. Tarnoff, Plaintiffs' Attorneys Protest Wellington Letter, Bus. INs., Sept. 23, 1985,
at 3, 55. The most common type of condition referred to here is radiographic evidence of
pleural placques. These placques are scars left on the pleura (linings of the lungs) which
alone, do not cause pulmonary dysfunction. R. Fontana, Lung Cancer and Asbestos Related
Pulmonary Disease, National Cancer Institute (1981).
257. 1 MEAL.EY'S LITIGATION REP.-AsssTos, supra note 250, at 2432-33.
258. 1 MEALEY's LITIGATION RFP.-As ESTOS, supra note 91, at 1947.
259. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
260. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
261. Riley, supra note 244, at 60.
262. Sweeney v. A C & S., Inc., No. C85-2984 (N.D. Ohio filed Nov. 15, 1985).
263. Id.
264. Tarnoff, Suit Seeks to Stall Asbestos Claims Facility, Bus. INS., Oct. 28, 1985, at
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should resolve claims on a "less contentious" basis.266 Moreover,
the suit presupposes that claimants will be treated unfairly even
though no claim has yet been handled by the Facility outside of
the tort system. 2 6 This is, as are most of the other complaints,
premature and unfair because it denies the Facility the opportu-
nity to show exactly how it will function.
V. CONCLUSION
At this writing a physical Facility per se does not exist except in
the planning stages. The Board of Directors is hopeful that the ac-
tual Facility will be operational by early 1986 and progress contin-
ues toward reaching this goal. However, there is a functional Facil-
ity in that the signatories have hired attorneys, known as Facility
Liaison Counsel, and have created, among others, an Interim
Claims Handling Committee.267 This Committee is comprised of
nine teams, each of which has an insurer and a producer member,
which are handling asbestos-related bodily injury cases as they
arise in the tort systems.268 It is thought that this system will con-
tinue until the Facility offices are staffed and operational, at which
point the permanent Facility staff will begin to handle the claims
outside of the courts.
2 69
There have been some encouraging signs that the Facility is
gaining acceptance and that it will be allowed to demonstrate that
it can handle the asbestos-related bodily injury claims as per its
policies and design. First, some cases have been settled and some
have been tried successfully by the Facility.270 Generally, these set-
tlements have been perceived as acceptable by the plaintiffs and
their attorneys. 271 Second, there have been several .educational
meetings held by Facility personnel for plaintiffs' attorneys which
in part have addressed the "impairment and dysfunction" issue.
21 2
These meetings have become progressively more amicable and the
sense is that most plaintiffs' lawyers will continue to cooperate
265. Id.
266. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Wellington Settlements Remain Extremely Active, 1 MEALEY's LrrIGA-
TION REP.-AsBESTOS 2917 (Sept. 27, 1985).
268. Id.
269. Private corporate records.
270. Wellington: Settlements, Attorney Briefings Continue, 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION
REP.-ASBESTOS 3014 (Oct. 11, 1985).
271. Id.
272. Settlements: Baron Rips Wellington for Settlement Posture, 1 MEALEY'S LITIGA-
TION REP.-ASBESTOS 3165 (Nov. 8, 1985).
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with the Facility while policy issues are resolved.2 7 Third, and per-
haps most encouraging, some plaintiffs' attorneys have recom-
mended that their clients accept the so-called "green cards" which
will allow the claimant to return to the Facility if and when his
disease progresses.2 74
In conclusion, it appears hopeful that the above pattern of pro-
gressive acceptance of the Facility will continue and that the more
serious questions about the Facility will be allowed to be resolved
as time passes. Moreover, it appears that the awkwardness and
mistrust, which are understandably connected to dealing with a
group of long-standing adversaries in a new entity, are lessening.
However, more work needs to be done and, notwithstanding the
adversarial nature of our society or the special interests of the
groups involved in asbestos-related litigation, the Facility, as the
only viable alternative to the court system, needs to be given every
chance to function and handle the problem for which it was
designed. As always, solutions require concessions and time must
be given to allow them to work. Therefore, the Asbestos Claims
Facility should be given the opportunity and cooperation to stand
or fall on its own merits. It should not be judged emotionally at a
point in time not long removed from its inception, but from the
perspective of a performance record which will show whether or
not it effectively handles the asbestos crises. It appears to be a
sound alternative to litigation and those who negotiated it, those
who designed it, and those who have thus far cooperated with it
are to be commended.
Leland G. Smith
273. 1 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REP.-ASBESTOS, supra note 270, at 3014.
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